nomic crisis and especially when compared to long-established strategies like quarantine. In fact, wartime vaccination rates in Nationalist territory are difficult to estimate, but do not seem to have risen above a fraction of the population. Why, then, pursue vaccination as a government-wide strategy, given the logistical and administrative obstacles?
Longstanding connections between disease and warfare-from the Taiping Rebellion, which spread cholera and plague across the lower Yangzi in the nineteenth century, to the 1918 global influenza pandemic that followed the First World War-prompted the Chinese state to focus on epidemic prevention and especially immunization in its health policy after FIG. 1 "Location of the Anti-Epidemic Units Sent to China by the League of Nations." This map of wartime China shows League of Nations staff distributions across unoccupied territory. The wartime capital of Chongqing is clearly visible at the center, as "Chungking"; Kunming lies to its southwest. The black triangles at Xi'an, Changsha, and Nanning represent major League unit bases. (Source: "Location of the Anti-Epidemic Units Sent to China by the League of Nations," League of Nations Health Organization, document CH 1333 , p. 10, 16 May 1938 Reproduced courtesy of the United Nations Archives at Geneva.) VOL. 60 412 1937. 6 Although wartime administrators might have chosen to invest in improving local diets, clinical care, or sanitary infrastructure, they perceived immunization to be something that they could implement swiftly, strategically, and centrally to protect the many refugees and soldiers roving across China's interior.
Vaccines have long occupied an uneasy place at the intersection of technology and health: both a drug and a tool, pharmaceutical yet rarely therapeutic, and closely identified with the instruments used to administer them. If vaccines themselves were objects that could induce bodily immunity against one disease in one person, "mass immunization" encompassed a variety of processes-from cultivating viruses and bacteria in laboratory animals to training vaccination teams-that contributed to the effort to immunize unoccupied China's population against cholera, plague, typhoid, and smallpox. In this article, I argue that it was only once health professionals and administrators treated mass immunization as a set of interconnected technological systems of cultivation, preservation, and distribution that it functionally succeeded as a public health strategy in China's wartime hinterland. 7 Wartime hardship and scarcity challenged the establishment of these systems, but also facilitated their development. The government focused its efforts on overcoming practical obstacles to producing, packaging, and transporting vaccines across the country not only because these products could stop epidemics, but also because mass immunization indicated the establishment of a new, modern, Western medical infrastructure which had been financially and logistically impossible before the Japanese invasion.
To develop mass immunization, the Chinese government solicited support from international aid organizations-in particular, the League of Nations. Here I consider a case study in northwest China, examining the wartime work of the Epidemic Prevention Bureau at its branch office in Lanzhou (capital of Gansu province) and a League unit that was based in Xi'an, in neighboring Shaanxi province. These units helped construct the technological systems that made mass immunization possible, although the presence of the League worked to undermine Nationalist authority as often as it bolstered state power. In the following sections, I analyze the efforts of the Bureau and the League to import standard vaccine samples, produce vaccines and sera on a large scale using experimental animals, and distribute them to local health administrations across China's wartime hinterland. Archival evidence reveals that systems of standardization, production, and distribution contributed to the establishment of a surprisingly robust mass immunization programme, albeit one limited in scope. The exigencies of war threw into stark clarity the practical role of vaccines in Chinese epidemic control, as well as their significance to the kind of modern health infrastructure that Nationalist officials sought to promote. Asia, 79. 7 . Thomas Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems."
Robert Peckham, Epidemics in Modern

Vaccines as Technologies of Health
Vaccines rarely appear in histories of medical technology, yet historians of medicine have described them as fundamentally technological. The historiography of medical technology, as articulated by Stanley Reiser, Audrey Davis, and others, has focused on diagnostic methods and instruments. 8 Joel Howell discusses a broader definition of "medical technology" that might include the means of accomplishing a particular clinical goal or the knowledge involved in so doing-as in, for instance, a urinalysis or blood test, as well as machines and artifacts used directly on or beside patientsbut maintains a focus on the diagnostic and therapeutic uses of such processes and/or tools. 9 In contrast, historians of medicine regularly identify vaccines and immunization strategies as technological, especially in non-Western settings. For instance, David Arnold and other historians of colonial India claim that "technical problems" and "operating technologies" of smallpox vaccine manufacture helped shape health policymaking there.
10
Randy Packard includes vaccines among a variety of "new medical and public-health technologies" that "promised to greatly reduce the global burden of disease" in the twentieth century.
11 Within the history of global health more broadly, immunization has exemplified the vertically organized, "short-term technological intervention" that characterized the activities of the World Health Organization and other international programs in the mid-twentieth century, as well as the later emergence of an emphasis on "appropriate technologies" in global health discourses.
12
In short, vaccines have occupied an unstable place in the historiography of medical technology. This study seeks to clarify that position by examining the technological qualities of immunization as a procedure that uses purpose-specific instruments to apply the products of complex, standardized processes, which often involve extensive machinery and laboratory apparatuses, directly to subjects. In wartime China, Nationalist administrators, like their colleagues in the League of Nations and other actors in the world of international health, saw mass immunization as a solution to difficult problems of rural health in part because of its technical nature. 11. Randall Packard, History of Global Health, 106. 12. Ibid., Theodore Brown, Marcos Cueto, and Elizabeth Fee, "World Health Organization, [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] 13. For instance, in July 1935, Jin Baoshan included immunization alongside health education and clinical emergency care as an important focus for rural hygiene policies, saying that although many rural people "were not clear on the importance of this kind Before the onset of war, the northwest-like much of rural Chinalacked a substantial health infrastructure, and so the establishment of mass immunization programs between 1937 and 1945 helped introduce modern hygiene to the region. At the time, public health was defined in terms of a set of practices associated with the term weisheng (衛生), which arose in the hyper-colonial treaty-ports of early twentieth-century China. These activities depended upon infrastructure building, like constructing sewers and municipal drains, as well as transformation of individual behaviors like using toilets-and immunization drives. Ruth Rogaski argues that these "technologies of the body" collectively defined an ideal of "hygienic modernity" that drew upon European concepts of health and associated ideas of political modernity, as well as discourses of Chinese weakness and deficiency. 14 The Nanjing Decade (1927-37) was a period of growth and organization for the Nationalist government in which the newly established National Health Administration sought to institutionalize state medicine. This effort drew upon discourses of hygienic modernity, and reflected the negotiation of complex and co-constitutive relationships between practitioners of a wide range of medical traditions prevalent in early twentieth-century China.
15 Health officials aspired to establish a national health system that prioritized technological development and large-scale manufacturing of biological products, like vaccines and sera, to control epidemics. Immunization played a major role in this vision: the first Sanitary Code that the National Health Administration issued, in 1928, specifically provided for the manufacture of vaccines and sera and the establishment of biomedical laboratories for research and development.
16 By the late 1930s, the state had made smallpox vaccination mandatory and planned immunization regimens for children in elementary schools.
17 From its 1919 establishment, the Epidemic Prevention Bureau's work was especially prominent; its first offices were at the Temple of Heaven, the complex at the heart of Beijing where the Ming and Qing emperors traditionally made yearly sacrifices for good harvests. The Bureau's occupation of the site implied that national strength and salvation might now lay in biomedicine, and especially immunization. Its work producing vaccines and sera was self-consciously techniof preventive injection, nevertheless there have been considerable results in smallpox vaccination drives." This statement implied that vaccines were useful as a health intervention because they did not require extensive public education in order to be implemented. Jin, "Wo guo xiangcun weisheng," 2.
14. Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, Yet the prewar effort to establish modern public health was hampered by a dearth of funds and organizational capacity, as well as weak political control by the Nationalist Party over territories outside central and southeastern China; these areas remained in the grip of warlords who had ruled there since the fall of the Qing. Lacking the resources to establish a comprehensive rural health program, the National Health Administration instead established model demonstration counties outside major cities to develop county health programs and train health personnel. 19 But the northwestern provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, and Ningxia felt few of the effects of these programs. A 1928 famine in the region killed 3 million and caused 20 million more to flee as refugees; in 1932, the region was hit by plague and cholera, and by the outbreak of war, the spread of smallpox, tuberculosis, cholera, and syphilis had caused major crises.
20
Although modern public health remained largely out of reach in the northwest, several institutions made inroads in the region. In 1934 the National Health Administration established an epizootic disease research station at Lanzhou, which would later become a branch of the National Epidemic Prevention Bureau. The station conducted epidemiological surveys and supported research into the prevention of infectious diseases in livestock. 21 In 1935, the National Health Administration sent a team to survey health in Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia provinces. 22 During this period Andrija Štampar, a representative from the League of Nations, provided guidance to the Nationalist government on rural health. 23 In 1929, the League established a program of technical collaboration in China; it was under these auspices that Štampar served as a consultant, and through which League representatives would later set up medical aid teams during the war. Yet by 1937, the northwest still lacked the microbiological laboratories and production facilities that would make it possible to launch largescale immunization programs. 
Vaccination in a Vulnerable Setting
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War created opportunities and challenges for the Nationalist government in the northwest. 24 After moving to Chongqing in 1937, Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalist government found western China to be a poor and dangerous place, where they faced banditry, Japanese air raids, and resistance from local warlords. Reestablishing the limited health programs that the Nationalist state had built before the war was not easy in such an environment. Yet vaccination against smallpox and other diseases remained a priority for the National Health Administration. Jin Baoshan, its director in 1938, wrote that a primary task of wartime public health was "preventive vaccination: to hold large-scale dissemination of smallpox inoculation and to inject vaccines for cholera, smallpox, etc.," as well as health education and environmental health.
25
It was largely due to the Nationalist state's perceived fragility that the League of Nations intervened. In September 1937, the Chinese delegation to the League proclaimed that an influx of refugees into western China was causing an epidemic crisis.
26 A formal memorandum began, "The Chinese Government finds itself faced with a problem of unparalleled gravity," and requested that the League establish an Epidemic Commission that could provide medical personnel and equipment. 27 Early in 1938, three League units began operations in Xi'an, Changsha, and Nanning, and set up clinics, trained health personnel, and purchased medicine and equipment for local administrations, operating until February 1939.
28
The technological nature of vaccination stands out in the context of China's wartime northwest in part because health professionals and administrators there struggled so much to establish it in a context of war and 24. The Chinese Communist Party also controlled base camps in Yan'an, at the intersection of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia provinces; technically united with the Nationalists but functionally independent, Yan'an was an environment in which Party leaders experimented with different methods of governance under conditions of financial and material scarcity. Although not the focus of this article, the League unit in Xi'an did provide limited material aid to health workers of the Chinese Communist Party in Yan'an. Aminda Smith, Thought Reform, 39.
25. Jin Baoshan, "Chang qi kang zhan," 46. 26. League of Nations Health Organization, "Anti-Epidemic Work in China," box 5775, record group 50, series 30817, dossier 31153; League of Nations Health Organization, Special Committee of the Health Committee for Technical Collaboration with China, "Statement by Dr. Victor Hoo, Representative of the Chinese Government," box 5775, record group 50, series 30817, dossier 31153; both in LON.
27. "League of Nations: Technical Collaboration Between the League of Nations and China," Geneva, 1 October 1937, p. 3, box 5775, record group 50, series 30817, dossier 31153, in LON.
28. League of Nations Health Organization, "Anti-Epidemic Work in China," box 5775, record group 50, series 30817, dossier 31153, in LON. The League also coordinated the donation of cholera vaccines to China from bacteriological institutes across the globe after a large-scale outbreak in 1938.
29. Wiebe Bijker, "Globalization and Vulnerability," 607-10. 30. Nelly Oudshoorn, "Vulnerability of Cyborgs," 768. 31. Wiebe Bijker, Annique Hommels, and Jessica Mesman, "Studying Vulnerability," 1-26. 32. "Sick Man of the Far East," 6.
poverty. Wiebe Bijker has called attention to "the vulnerability of technological cultures": the fragility of large technological systems and the organizations and people on which they rely, which is not an intrinsic trait of such systems but a product of their particular circumstances. 29 Scholars have responded in various ways; most notably, Nelly Oudshoorn argues for the significance of vulnerabilities that are a function of "the close intertwinement of technologies and bodies" characteristic of modern medicine. 30 Vulnerability in technological cultures is a useful concept here because the fragility of mass immunization in the war-torn environment of northwest China shaped its design and implementation. 31 For instance, transportation delays in the shipping of vaccines could make thousands of them ineffective in a single day; the glass vials in which they were packed were easily breakable; and an influx of refugees had placed northwestern disease ecologies under incredible stress. Moreover, discourses of hygienic modernity connected the fragility of public health systems to the notion, then widespread both domestically and abroad, that China itself was politically and culturally vulnerable. In 1905, a New York Times article deemed it the "Sick Man of the Far East," symbolically linking political weakness to medical catastrophe. 32 During the war, political upheaval did result in increased epidemiological risk, placing ever-greater demands upon China's health infrastructure. After 1937, locals, refugees, soldiers, and foreign aid workers all existed in a war zone, subject to spiraling economic inflation and consequent poverty, and exposed to a variety of infectious diseases.
Mass immunization remained a fragile system throughout the war, and many people still died from infectious disease, despite the efforts of the Bureau and the League. As the following sections on standards, experimental organisms, and distribution networks show, although danger and scarcity characterized the development of vaccination technologies in wartime China, the acknowledgement of vulnerability in the several different systems that supported mass immunization ultimately facilitated foreign and state support of this project. The enduring goal of establishing a national, modern, technologically sophisticated public health system justified attention to and investment in the systems of standardization, preservation, and transport that enabled the mass production of vaccines.
Standard Cultures in Exceptional Times
In September 1938, when the Epidemic Prevention Bureau transferred to Kunming, Tang Feifan headed a convoy of six trucks full of glass bottle-33. John Cameron, "Pharmacy in China," 148. 34. Christoph Gradmann and Jonathan Simon, "Introduction," 1-12. See also Ted Porter, Trust in Numbers.
35. For example, Joseph Aronson and Patricia Schneider, "Problem of Standardization," 533-44; Nicola Tauraso, Thomas O'Brien, and Edward Seligman Jr., "Problems of Influenza Virus," 497-506; Arthur Felix, "Preparation, Testing, and Standardization, 36. Gradmann and Simon, "Introduction," 6-8; Pauline Mazumdar, "Antitoxin and Anatoxine"; Susan Leigh Star and James Griesemer, "Institutional Ecology," 387-420.
37. Cay-Rüdiger Prüll, "Paul Ehrlich's Standardization," 13-30.
ware, scientific instruments, and rabbits. Much of this equipment was to be used for standardization of vaccines. 33 Standardization was a necessary condition for the establishment of mass immunization, as a means of establishing the consistent effectiveness-and therefore trustworthinessof the shots. In 1937 vaccine producers used standard cultures: samples of sera, bacteria, and viruses with a clearly defined, reproducible biochemical composition. These cultures were grown and passaged through experimental animals to produce larger quantities of material that, when packed, stored, transported, and introduced to the human body, induced immunity against a particular pathogen. The standard cultures used by Chinese researchers were largely the products of European debates in the 1920s. By the interwar period, Western corporations and institutes sought to set quantitative definitions for the effectiveness of vaccines and other biological products by circulating standard samples with fixed effectiveness.
34 But making such a sample was not an easy task. It was extremely difficult to accurately measure the quantity of antigens (the toxins that induce immune responses) in any given immunization. It was also impossible to ascertain the extent to which any test of a vaccine's potency in an animal correlated to its effectiveness on human subjects. 35 In the early twentieth century, the process of standardizing vaccines and sera made them "boundary objects" in networks of biological research: things that held shifting definitions for the variety of groups which interacted with them-i.e., health care workers, patients, researchers at the laboratory bench-but which achieved stability as a consequence of connecting these groups.
36
The League of Nations became an early leader in the standardization of biological products, seeing this task as a means of fulfilling its mandate to promote international cooperation. national standards for sera, insulin, vitamins, sulfa drugs, and other therapeutic substances. 38 While early standardization initiatives have been well studied, little attention has been paid to how laboratories outside Europe sought to implement them. At the time of its move to Kunming in 1937, the National Epidemic Prevention Bureau was the primary national authority in producing and determining standard cultures. Its offices in Beijing and Nanjing manufactured over forty different types of sera, vaccines, and antitoxins (against cholera, plague, tetanus, pertussis, and diphtheria, in addition to smallpox). 39 In Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chengdu, branches of the Pasteur Institute also made and sold vaccines, primarily against smallpox. 40 Before the war, the Bureau regularly obtained samples for standardization from the League via the State Serum Institute of Denmark, as well as the American National Institute of Health and British Medical Research Council.
41 Its procedures mandated that every lot of vaccines or sera be tested by a separate Standardization Laboratory to ensure it conformed to standard requirements, a practice that continued after the Bureau established wartime offices in Kunming and Lanzhou 42 ( fig. 2 ). In wartime China, preserving biological cultures was not easy. Even though the Bureau had retained six trucks' worth of material, this was a fraction of its original holdings; Tang and his staff had had to jettison much more during the journey to Yunnan. The acquisition of new standard cultures was therefore necessary for the establishment of mass immunization systems in China, making the wartime intervention of the League of Nations particularly important. When representatives of the League of Nations-Health Organization arrived in China's wartime southwest in 1938, they emphasized production of biological materials according to their organization's own standard models.
In January 1938, Hermann Mooser, a Swiss bacteriologist, arrived in Xi'an to take up a post as commissioner of the League's northern unit. He found that his liaison with the Nationalist government, a physician named Yang Yongnian (楊永年) who had studied with Henry Dale in London and worked at Britain's National Institute for Medical Research, had commandeered local stocks of bacterial and smallpox vaccines. But Mooser was hesitant to accept the products. 43 He wrote back to Geneva, "I have turned down already most of their stocks of cholera and typhoid vaccine. . . . Of 47. Hermann Mooser to Smets, Geneva, 3 November 1938, box 5786, record group the smallpox vaccine, I accepted those lots which, by animal experiment, proved to be of sufficient potency." 44 Discarding any vaccines represented a significant loss of time and resources in a state of scarcity, and there seems to have been some disagreement between Mooser and Yang over their viability. Mooser alluded to this issue by concluding, "Fortunately Dr. Yang understood my attitude and finally agreed with me regarding the procedure to be followed." 45 Mooser enforced and upheld the standards that the League had set, but in doing so came into conflict with local values and norms in the wartime northwest.
Mooser's involvement in local health administration soon extended to the work of nearby laboratories, especially the Northwest Epidemic Prevention Bureau in Lanzhou. In 1938 Mooser took a larger role in the laboratory's operations, supplying it with personnel and equipment after clashing with Edgar Tsen (Chen Zongxian 陳宗賢), Tang's immediate predecessor at the National Epidemic Prevention Bureau. 46 Mooser later described both Yang and Tsen as "two intelligent scoundrels" who cut corners in vaccine production; discussing their mismanagement, in November 1938 he wrote, "The Commissioners should not be exposed to the risk of depending on China's production laboratories!!" 47 This description indicated competition 55 "Dick" indicated the Dick test for scarlet fever, which used a preparation derived from streptococcus bacteria to diagnose the disease. 56 The telegram also requested documents published by the National Institute for Medical Research in London. The message reveals the urgent importance that researchers attributed to textual instructions for the use of these strains, as well as the materials themselves, for the production of standard antitoxins and cultures. Receiving them from Copenhagen and London, as well as from Hanoi, allowed Chinese researchers to continue to participate in global immunological networks of materials, texts, and people. These networks underlay the systems of standardization and cultivation that made the establishment of comprehensive immunization programs in the northwest possible.
Using Animals to Make Vaccines and Sera from Standard Strains
Obtaining standard cultures was only the first step in a long process. The production of vaccines in wartime China relied upon two important technological systems: experimental animals in which viruses, bacteria, and sera could be cultivated, and mechanical equipment to process the lymph and sera they produced into immunizations. The war made it difficult to find the right animals in sufficient numbers, and Bureau staffers or League members often relied on interregional or international networks to get organisms. Using experimental animals allowed laboratories to produce immunizations on industrial scales and ultimately enabled the northwest to manufacture vaccines locally, thereby avoiding complete reliance on getting biological products from abroad in a time of precarious transport networks. 59. Ilana Löwy, "From Guinea Pigs to Man," 270-71. A lethal suspension of cholera was injected into a guinea pig; sera was taken from the corpse and introduced into the next pig, and repeated until the solution was no longer virulent enough to kill; then the vaccine was deemed ready for human use.
60. Annick Guénel, "Cattle for the Colony," 95-115; see also Rebecca J. H. Woods, "From Colonial Animal," 117-36.
Experimental animals had long constituted a significant technological system for microbiologists around the world. 57 From the late nineteenth century onward, guinea pigs, horses, and calves provided the material basis for a body of knowledge about cultivating specific strains of bacteria and viruses. For instance, in the manufacture of live cholera vaccine, serial passage of strains through animals was critical-not just for producing enough material for making vaccines on a large scale, but also for preserving the virulence (effectiveness, or ability to infect host cells), of the original samples. Describing the production of cholera vaccine in northwest China, a 1938 League report noted, "Each time a new strain is isolated it is used for vaccine production and an older strain which had lost some of its virulence discarded or made highly virulent again by animal passage." 58 This note likely referred to a common method that involved subcutaneous intraperitoneal inoculation of guinea pigs (or doves, or rabbits) with a virulent strain of cholera.
59
The animal husbandry of Bureau staffers resembled colonial management of livestock elsewhere in Asia. In French Indochina, veterinarians contributed to the exploitation of domestic animal resources, protecting the health of livestock and promoting animal husbandry, drawing on knowledge not only in veterinary medicine, but also in agronomy and other related fields; in particular, they worked with the Pasteur Institute set up at Nha Trang to develop and distribute rinderpest vaccines for cattle, which resulted in improved survival rates for cattle during the 1930s. Annick Guénel refers to this collective body of knowledge as "zootechny." 60 The Lanzhou Bureau had been established in a similar context of epizootic research, and while farming was not the immediate concern of wartime microbiologists, they did use scientific methods to manage the animals that they needed for their work. In the wartime context, researchers employed a different kind of zootechny, one that involved knowledge of animal physiology and serology alongside bacteriology, immunology, and medicine.
Ensuring a steady supply of appropriate animals and keeping them housed, fed, and secure imposed significant constraints on vaccine devel-opment in wartime China. Because biomedical laboratories sought to manufacture vaccines and antisera that would confer immunity against a variety of diseases, they often needed many different animals through which to cultivate sera using techniques of serial passaging. Determining the suitability of a species for passaging depended on whether it could be infected with and transmit the disease in question. For instance, mice could be used to prepare typhoid vaccine, rabbits were preferable for manufacturing rabies and smallpox vaccine, and horses were used for immunization with meningococci, diphtheria, and tetanus toxoid. 61 These organisms were not always specially bred, like Morgan's flies or Little's mice, to ensure their suitability for experiment (although Jiang Lijing has shown that Chinese biologists in the 1920s were keenly interested in developing indigenous species like the goldfish as experimental models). 62 For instance, the Bureau in Lanzhou reportedly captured some of its horses from the Japanese Army. 63 Rabbits, guinea pigs, mice, horses: all of these organisms required particular care and support. The National Epidemic Prevention Bureau's organization policies dictated that the second division of the Bureau, primarily responsible for making sera and antisera, also manage the "care and breeding of animals used for experimental research and development."
64
As a station originally built to research rinderpest and other epizootic diseases, the Northwest Epidemic Prevention Bureau in Lanzhou was already equipped to support a variety of animals and had ample space for keeping and pasturing livestock (see fig. 3 ). Photographs show that the Northwest Bureau had the capacity to house enough horses to support large-scale sera production, and a 1938 inventory reveals that it had at its disposal fifteen horse stalls, seven cowsheds, and sixteen sheds for experimental animals like mice and guinea pigs.
65 Just a few animals could produce large amounts of vaccine; for instance, the laboratory's monthly report from December 1938 reports that ten calves inoculated with standard stock of Vaccinia had produced about 37,680 capillary tubes of smallpox vaccines, and two white mice produced 9,000 cc of typhus vaccine 66 ( fig. 3 ). In some cases, the scarcity of appropriate organisms required creative substitutions. For instance, in Kunming, during a shortage of rabbits, staff of the Epidemic Prevention Bureau found that guinea pigs could provide suitable subjects for titrating smallpox vaccine. 67 In other cases, the inaccessibility of laboratory animals caused laboratories to change course in their production plans. For example, in 1938 Mooser complained about a scarcity of calves in northwest China. 68 Without calves-or a suitable alternative, like water buffalo-Mooser could not produce sufficient cowpox lymph to manufacture smallpox vaccines in large quantities. 69 Mooser's unit instead changed the focus of its work entirely, to the production of cholera vaccines.
The case of smallpox vaccination illustrates the ways in which availability of materials and equipment, as well as animals, shaped the wartime development of immunizations. At the National Epidemic Prevention Bureau headquarters in Kunming, staffers encountered a demand for dried smallpox vaccine, because it was easier to transport over long distances. The standard preparation method was ill-suited to conditions of war; it required fresh lymph to age for several months in a refrigerated glycerine suspension, in order to reduce the bacterial content of the lymph. 70 Facing a shortage of glycerine, researcher Wei Hsi (Wei Xi 魏曦) inoculated a calf with Vaccinia and drew lymph from it seven days later. Wei ground the lymph into powder and dissolved it in a solution of gum acacia that he prepared using materials from a laboratory in Calcutta. After desiccating the vaccine, he tested it on rabbits and found that, compared to their glycerinetreated counterparts, these vaccines were equally potent in preventing smallpox. 71 Wartime scarcities thus led Bureau researchers to develop a novel technical method for vaccine production. In addition to experimental animals, researchers needed a variety of specialized materials and tools in order to manufacture vaccines on a large scale. Calves and rabbits alone were not enough for Tang and Wei to develop smallpox vaccines; they also needed agar for cultures, syringes to extract lymph, refrigerators to keep it cool, glassware for storage, and mortars and pestles that could grind up the lymph. The difficulty of building or importing necessary equipment was a significant constraint for vaccine production. For instance, in January 1939, Heinrich Jettmar, a League representative in Xi'an, requested mechanical triturators (grinding machines used in preparing lymph). Writing to Geneva, Jettmar noted that it was important to get pedal-driven machines, given unpredictable supplies of electricity in the northwest. 72 He explained that the new equipment was especially important because of a planned smallpox vaccination drive, writing, "Much raw material [i.e. lymph] has been collected but the laboratory is greatly handicapped by the old fashioned grinding machines." 73 Jettmar concluded, "The Latin proverb: 'Bis dat, qui cito dat," is especially in place as far as the present technical collaboration of the League with China is concerned." 74 In wartime conditions, the need to not just produce vaccines, but produce as many vaccines as possible, exacerbated demand for industrial-scale production equipment.
The language of scarcity pervaded correspondence about laboratory supplies. For instance, a 1938 report from the League explained that although the Lanzhou Epidemic Prevention Bureau had its own power station and water supply, much of its equipment was in danger of failing: "The existing outfit, such as refrigerator, incubators, autoclaves centrifuges etc. need repairs by specialists, and should be partly replaced with new and up-to-date material." 75 The need was real, but it was also in the interests of administrators applying for ever-diminishing funds to emphasize their desperation. Laboratories were vulnerable to a variety of predations. For instance, Joseph Needham wrote of an apparently widespread wartime practice in which smaller scientific organizations packed all their equipment up whenever the leadership changed. The purpose of this "extraordinary bureaucratic caper" was to prevent new officials from knowing the extent of any previous graft. 76 Common theft was also a concern in China's poverty-wracked hinterland: in April 1938, a storehouse for one of the League units in Changsha was robbed of spare parts, and other League representatives were advised to hire night watchmen. 77 In the face of air raids, theft, and poverty, laboratories had to justify the purchase of-and carefully protect-every instrument and animal. These objects and organisms were critical components of the technological systems that comprised immunization in the wartime northwest.
Immunizing across the Hinterland
The distribution of vaccines across the wartime hinterland was predicated on extensive technical systems of storage and transport. The shipping cartons and packing materials, the glass containers, the refrigeration they required while being held in port, and the various customs regulations that hindered or facilitated their transport: all created unique limitations that shaped the implementation of mass immunization in the northwest. The Nationalist state played a major role in both enacting and overcoming these hindrances, as well as in working with the League to organize vaccination work.
The arrival of the Nationalist government in Chongqing sparked a flurry of local infrastructure building. But during the war, all communications routes across unoccupied territory were compromised and subject to delays. Newly built roads connected the western provinces, and firms like the Southwestern Transportation Company arose to truck goods across the hinterland, but highways were prone to washouts, rockslides, and banditry. J. P. Mauclaire, a League agent, noted that truck drivers might actually spread infectious disease, since their mobile lifestyles meant that they could easily avoid vaccination. 78 Only Xi'an and Kunming had access to Kweyang-Chungking-Chengtu," December 1939, box " 1938, p. 11, box 5785, record group 50, series 30817, dossier 33625, in LON. 84. Ibid. railway lines, which were extremely limited. 79 The Minsheng Shipping Company operated cargo boats on the upper Yangzi and played a critical role in shipping goods to Chongqing. Air travel was costly and dangerous; frequent air raids meant disruptions and delays in flight schedules. 80 To move any product, much less delicate vaccines and sera, across Nationalist territory was therefore no easy task. Vaccines were fragile things. Packed in breakable glass containers, they had a limited period of viability, during which they had to be kept cool and in sterile conditions. 81 Disregarding these requirements meant risking their effectiveness and safety, and possibly wasting resources in a period of national need. Therefore, laboratories prioritized maintaining a sterile environment to avoid contamination in the production or packing stagessomething that was particularly difficult in the dusty environment of Lanzhou, and which often stopped work there during the summer. The Lanzhou Bureau had its own glass factory to ensure a steady supply of sterile vials.
82 As fig. 4 shows, smallpox vaccines, penicillin, and other biological products were typically packaged in glass bottles with hard caps or cloth stuffed in their tops.
Japanese air raids and challenging sub-tropical environments significantly impeded the establishment of transport and communication links, or water and power supplies. So a seemingly simple thing like reliable refrigeration for vaccines was often unattainable. For example, the refrigerators at the Lanzhou Epidemic Prevention Bureau were constantly in need of repair, directly limiting the ability of the laboratory to manufacture smallpox vaccines. When the League pursued the alternative measure of purchasing vaccines in Hanoi and Canton, refrigeration was again a problem; the shipment was delayed in hot conditions because of the wartime cancellation of air connections to Xi'an. "It is well possible that most of the vaccine may have lost its potency on arrival at Sian [Xi'an] ," fretted Mooser, "as it has been left for weeks in the offices of the Eurasia Aviation Company at Hong Kong without refrigeration."
83 Delays in overland transport thus spelled doom for the cargo.
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Piles of local bureaucratic red tape further obstructed the transportation and distribution of vaccines. In Yunnan, customs officials insisted on the payment of provincial duties on the drugs, medical supplies, instruments, automobiles, and other equipment that the units shipped, often detaining shipments in order to collect these fees. 85 The minutes of a 1938 League meeting in Guilin noted similar practices in Guangxi province: "Vaccines from the Nanning laboratory, sent to Canton, or glassware bought in Canton for use in the Nanning laboratory, are liable to tax."
86 Inter-provincial and port duties further impeded the prompt delivery of parcels, a critical matter when it came to vaccines that might expire after a given date, and so the League made arrangements with the Nationalist government for special certificates specifying exemption from taxes to accompany its cartons.
87
Individual crises of shipment delay, contamination, or expiration-often caused by national or local administrative entanglements-were thus actually routine and characteristic of the process of distribution.
Once vaccines arrived at their destinations, local immunization teams set about administering them. The successful clinical delivery of vaccines in wartime China required instruments, technical expertise, and successful 85. Smets, Geneva, to Hoo Chi-Tsai, Geneva, 13 March 1939, box 5791, record group 50, series 30817, dossier 36123; S. G. Xenakis, Geneva, to Hoo Chi-Tsai, Geneva, 9 May 1939, box negotiation with those targeted for immunization. Vaccines and sera, once out of storage, had to undergo specialized technical processes in order to become medically useful. Sometimes this process entailed drawing the fluid out of the glass vial into a syringe and then injecting it into the subject's veins, muscles, or skin. In other cases, it involved more complex processes. For instance, when the League of Nations imported dried smallpox vaccine to Xi'an from Bandung in March 1938, its technicians had to grind up the vaccine and mix it in a glycerine solution. Because the mortars that the unit used for grinding were too large, and the dried vaccine was divided into many glass capillary tubes for distribution, the sticky solution adhered to the mortars and the tubes, resulting in a much lower yield of vaccine preparations than anticipated. What should have immunized 2,000 people against smallpox only inoculated 800. "It was therefore necessary to use mortars as small as possible for the preparation of the emulsion, and give it to the vaccinators in small narrow glass tubes," concluded one report. 88 The report noted the inadequacy of this solution, writing, "Such a procedure is feasible in a place where laboratory facilities are available, but not in the field." 89 The specific instruments used to prepare vaccines for administration were therefore critical to their successful use on a large scale.
Not all vaccines were administered with hypodermic needles, but many were, and this process required specialized technical knowledge. Western medical practice in China had long emphasized the use of injections; syringes entered China's urban medical marketplaces on a large scale during the early twentieth century, and in the Republican period, Chinese preferred to inject substances, like aspirin or caffeine, that Americans and Europeans typically ingested or inhaled.
90 Early twentieth-century medical texts discussed the particular knowledge needed to successfully inject vaccines and sera. For instance, Zhang Jian's book Zuixin zhushe liaofa (Newest treatment by injection) described intravenous, intramuscular, and intradermal methods of injection. Following disinfection of the skin and all instruments, the vaccinator had to follow sterile processes to open the glass ampoules that held the vaccine and to fill the syringe with the material to be injected. 91 Local health bureaus offered training sessions to instruct vaccinators; for example, in June 1938 a course in Baoji, west of Xi'an, lasted three to four days and provided one dollar a day for living expenses. different immunizations they administered; they also had to convince people to get vaccinated, often introducing the practice to their neighborhoods. Whether employed by local health bureaus or the League, vaccinators used their needles to apply state-sanctioned power directly, and sometimes forcibly, to individual bodies. 93 In Paochi (Baoji), near Xi'an, the teams went door to door in residential neighborhoods and set up stations at the city gates. 94 In some cases, resistance to immunization dictated its method and frequency. The League unit reported that when it came to large-scale cholera immunization, the normal practice of multiple immunizations with small doses of vaccine would not work, because too many people dodged their second shot. "The only feasible method especially among large masses of moving people," reported Mooser, "is to attempt immunisation with one large single dose."
95 Immunization was therefore not just a one-way transfer from the laboratory bench to the clinic; laboratories considered the results of vaccination drives and modified procedures accordingly. And vaccinators sometimes forced shots upon people who resisted. Describing a certification system that required all travelers to Xi'an to receive a cholera jab, Mooser noted that passengers were "all warned to keep [their certificates] as a 'free pass' to enable them to move about the city unmolested by our eager Inoculators."
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The total number of people vaccinated against smallpox, cholera, or typhoid fever during the war remained far from the whole of unoccupied China's population. In Xi'an, the League typically vaccinated between 3,000 and 71,000 people against smallpox every month, and a total of at least 220,000 between March and December 1938. In a city with a population of 230,000, this was significant, but high numbers of transient refugees, as well as many rural areas and smaller cities of western China, escaped such thorough coverage by immunization squads. The significance of mass immunization thus lies primarily in the fact of its establishment, given that public health was largely absent in the northwest before the war. Mass immunization also held symbolic power as a means of establishing national, as well as individual, strength. A 1941 radio broadcast discussing immunization as a weapon to fight potential Japanese bio-warfare initiatives claimed, "The officers and soldiers at the front, and fellow citizens at 97. Guo Keda, "Dijun shiyong xijun zhan," 11. The broadcast probably referred to anti-dysentery serum, rather than vaccination. the rear, should all receive preventive injections, or vaccinations, against cholera, dysentery, and typhoid," and that after doing so "the body has immunity, so that even though disease may be transmitted it may not have lethal danger." 97 Although it was unlikely that every single person in Nationalist territory could get these shots, the broadcast suggested that immunization could contribute to successful national resistance to Japan, overcoming national weakness via the establishment of a modern and technologically sophisticated health program-much as discourses of hygienic modernity had encouraged at the turn of the twentieth century. What the broadcast did not fully explain was that the establishment of this program had depended on a number of technological systems of cultivation, standardization, and preservation, each with a diverse set of actors and materials.
Conclusion
Wartime exigencies led the Nationalist state to request aid in obtaining the standard cultures, animals, and equipment necessary to manufacture vaccines on a large scale. Although the wartime government did not fully implement the nationwide programs of public health and hygienic modernity that its administrators had planned before the war, it did work with international agencies and especially the League of Nations to prioritize vaccine research and development as one key part of this project. Mass immunization during the war depended on a variety of technological systems: the shipping and use of standard cultures, cultivating microorganisms in experimental animals, and preserving vaccines and sera on the way to their final destinations: the bloodstreams of Chinese subjects.
Vaccination was a crucial component of wartime health policy for the Nationalist government. This article has also sought to demonstrate its particular significance as a technology of health. Each little glass ampoule contained fixed chemical combinations that conformed to international standards, and was the result of a complex process of cultivation in animal systems. Their arrival at cities, towns, and military bases depended on an extensive support network involving syringe and ampoule production, refrigeration, and other technologies. Local administrations and the central state played significant roles in these processes, from mandating, financing, and regulating vaccine development to organizing vaccination teams. They also involved negotiations among policymakers, microbiological researchers, and the people giving and receiving shots, so that the medical workers and subjects using these systems shaped them as much as the researchers and administrators who made them. Wartime scarcity and vul-nerability shaped the evolution of mass immunization, but also facilitated support of and investment in this strategy.
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